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Gaining and Sustaining Long-term Advantage Through Information Technology 
How have U.S. and Japanese firms organized and managed the process of 
becoming recognized leaders in using information technology (IT) to achieve long-
term sustainable advantage? Answering this question is the overall purpose of this 
project, which has been underwritten by a multi-year grant from the Sloan 
Foundation. The project has used case specific studies, each of which is complete in 
itself. This and the other studies are listed in Box 1. 
The cases support an initial research hypothesis: leading U.S. and Japanese 
software users are very sophisticated in the ways they have integrated software into their 
business strategies. They use IT to institutionalize organizational strengths and to 
continually capture the knowledge generated by their business operations. As an 
introduction to the specifics of the case presented in this paper for Nomura Research, an 
outline of the focus of the project and the general methodology used is presented here. In 
addition, there is an overview of the historical importance of customized software in 
Japan and how that compares to the United States. 
Focus of the Cases 
All the cases are written with a strategic focus. That is, each study examines a 
firm's strategy for using IT, rather than looking at the specific software or IT systems 
used. The latter generally is noted only to illustrate and explain the former. This emphasis 
was not specified when the project began, but evolved as research progressed. 
Business strategies are important in understanding IT strategies because the 
implementation and design of each company's IT systems and software strategy is unique 
to its competitive situation, industry and strategic objectives. These factors influence how 
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Box 1 - The Studies and How to Obtain Copies 
The studies are on food retailing (Ito-Yokado), semiconductors (NEC and AMD), pharmaceuticals 
(Takeda and Merck), retail banking (Sanwa and Citibank), life insurance (Meiji and Nationwide (which 
replaced USAA, as the latter was unable to participate)), investment banking (Nomura-NRI and Credit 
Suisse First Boston), autos (Toyota), steel (integrated mills and mini-mills), (Nippon Steel, Tokyo Steel and 
Nucor), and apparel retailing (Isetan and Federated). 
The industries and cases generally were selected based on the advice and research of specific 
industry centers funded by the Sloan Foundation. These are the computer and software center at Stanford, 
the semiconductor and software centers at the University of California, Berkeley, the financial services 
center at Wharton, the pharmaceutical and auto centers at MIT, the steel project at Carnegie-Mellon, the 
food services project at the University of Minnesota, and the apparel center at Harvard. 
Completed papers are available under "Programs" at the Center on Japanese Economy and 
Business' website: gsb.columbia.edu/japan. 
a firm chooses between IT options for achieving specific goals and measures its success. 
Indeed, the leading software users examined in this Sloan study link IT strategies with 
business goals through mission statements that explicitly note the importance of 
information technology to competitive success. In addition, because IT is seen as 
important to competitive success, information technology is specifically linked via 
organization, products and services to related corporate objectives. 
Beyond this general observation, there are four (related) reasons the cases became 
focused this way. First, in the interviews and conversations with management, responses 
were primarily in terms of strategic principles. This indicates that the firms manage IT 
decision-making by following a set of strategic principles that has been integrated with 
their view of the competitive environment and core competencies. This is similar to the 
Nelson and Winter (1982) rules and routines for other kinds of management decisions 
and innovations, and illustrates these firms' evolutionary approach to IT use and 
development. 
Second, information technology changes very rapidly and thus each firm is 
constantly upgrading and evolving its systems. Detailed descriptions therefore would 
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rapidly become obsolete. Third, at a general level, differences in firm IT systems can be 
almost trivial, as there are only a limited number of operating system options. Finally, at 
a detailed level, all the firms have unique software and IT systems because of the way 
each weaves organization with packaged and custom software. There is thus little others 
could learn if a study just explained the detailed IT systems used. The cases would be 
very long and would drown the reader in data. This was apparent when the project team 
tried to develop IT organization charts for Takeda, Merck and NEC. 
General Methodology 
All the cases initially were developed using a common methodology to examine 
cross-national pairs of firms in key industries. In principle, each pair focuses on a 
Japanese and a U.S. firm in an industry where IT is a significant and successful aspect of 
competitive performance. The initial set of firms was recommended by the related Sloan 
industry centers. To develop these "best-practice" studies the research team combined 
analysis of current research results with questionnaires and direct interviews. The team 
talked with the industry centers in order to relate these materials to previous work, as well 
as to utilize their expertise. 
In this way a set of questions that specifically relate to a firm's business strategy 
and IT's role within that were developed. New questions were coupled with materials 
used in a 1993-95 study (Rapp 1995), thereby relating each candidate and industry to 
earlier results. Some questions address issues that appear relatively general across 
industries, such as inventory control. Others, such as managing the integrated circuit (IC) 
manufacturing process, are more industry-specific. The focus has been to establish the 
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firm's perception of its industry and its competitive position, as well as its advantage in 
developing and using a particular IT strategy. 
Customers, competitors, and industry analysts were contacted to determine 
whether competitive benefits or impacts perceived by the firm were recognized outside 
the organization. Further data were gathered from firms and organizations that had helped 
in the earlier project. The key questions and issues are summarized in Box 2. 
Customized Software 
Although Japanese users historically have relied heavily on customized and semi-
customized software (Rapp 1995, 1998 and 1999), this gradually is changing toward a 
more selective use of packaged software managed via customized systems, including 
proprietary middleware. (Box 3 discusses the reasons for the importance of customized 
software in Japan.) 
Box 2 - Key Questions and Issues 
The project team sought to answer key questions while recognizing firm, industry, and country 
differences. The questions are broken into the following categories. 
General Management and Corporate Strategy 
Industry Related Issues 
Competition 
Country Related Issues 
IT Strategy 
IT Operations 
Human Resources and Organization 
Various Measures such as Inventory Control, Cycle Times and Cost Reduction 
A wide range of issues, from direct use of IT to achieve competitive advantage, to corporate strategy, 
to criteria for IT selection, to industry economics, to success measures, to organizational integration, to 
beneficial loops, to training and institutional dynamics, and finally to inter-industry comparisons, is thus 
covered. These issues have been broadly explained and compared in two Sloan-project summary papers (Rapp 
1998 Dec; 1999 Jun). The issues are set forth for NRI relative to its two major clients in Appendix I, which 
readers can use to understand and enhance their own firms' competitiveness in IT services. 
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Box 3 - Reasons for the Importance of Customized Software in Japan 
The origins and gradual development of customization in Japan began in the early 1960s. MITI 
promoted the development of the Japanese computer industry with subsidies and by sponsoring multiple 
alliances with overseas producers including RCA, GE, and Honeywell. The resulting operating system 
fragmentation among Japanese producers led them to provide free software in order to lock users into their 
hardware. However, it fragmented the software market due to the development over time of multiple and 
incompatible user systems. As the early development of computer use in Japan was for mainframes, this 
resulted in large, highly integrated, but unique systems for large users. Toyota and Nippon Steel, for 
example, have used computers to manage their production systems since the 1960s. 
Gradually, though, what was perceived as an expensive legacy was seen to have advantages in 
promoting consistency and tying the organization and its culture together in ways that could not be 
emulated. The long-term employment system helped firms to train and retain the personnel needed to 
manage and upgrade the IT systems. This situation was further promoted by the firms' experience in 
technology acquisition and in successful management of unique production systems through integrated 
organizational structures. Thus, their IT strategies to a degree are a continuation by other means of their 
traditional strategic focus on growth, cutting costs, and increasing market share through constant 
improvement and technological advances. 
Customized IT plays a key role in these firms' intra-industry development strategies, including 
their emergence and competitive impact as multinational enterprises. The use of captive subsidiaries is a 
direct extension of this strategic approach, and demonstrates the firms' commitment to continuing their 
current emphasis on unique customized systems. This means the market for vertical application software 
will continue to be fragmented, industry-oriented, and user based. (For more detail on this market structure 
see Rapp [1995]). 
Conversely, US firms, which have often relied more on packaged software, are 
customizing more. This is especially true when the company wishes to initiate a new 
product or service that advances the competitive envelope, but for which no packaged 
software product exists because demand has not yet developed. Customizing also is more 
likely for the systems needed to integrate software packages into something more closely 
linked to the firm's business strategies, markets, and organizational structure. 
Thus, on the whole, there appears to be convergence in the strategic approach of 
the leading software users examined in the Sloan study. More particularly, the cases 
confirm the intuitively obvious point that a necessary condition for a successful IT 
strategy is a coherent business strategy. (These and other summary results are presented 
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in Rapp 1998 December and 1999 June.) It is these strategic links between business and 
technology objectives that are presented for NRI in this study. 
Nomura Research Institute Case Study 
Nomura Research Institute (NRI) can be described simply as a large leading 
Japanese systems integrator and IT consulting firm with extensive IT and computer-
related services capabilities. But it has made use of those capabilities in very creative 
ways. Although, the detailed strategy described here applies only to NRI and its 
particular mandates, especially its relationships with its principal clients, the Nomura 
Group and Ito-Yokado, lessons can be learned from what NRI has done. Hence this 
study. (Box 4 provides a more complete description of NRI and Box 5 offers details on 
why the company became one of the cases for the study on using IT to improve 
competitive advantage.) 
As part of understanding NRI's competitive situation, this study examines some of 
the governmental policies, economic factors, and competitive dynamics affecting NRI's 
major markets, finance and distribution. More particularly, it is because its two major 
clients are respectively Japan's largest securities firm and leading retailer that NRI has 
developed expertise in related IT systems and support that it has then used to solicit third-
party business. The business pressures on NRI emanating from developments in finance 
Acknowledgment: the case writer and research team want to express appreciation to the Alfred P Sloan 
Foundation for making this work possible, and to the Sloan industry centers for their invaluable assistance. 
Presentations from Wharton's financial services group at Sloan Industry Center meetings from 1997-99, as 
well as papers produced by that Center, aided selection of NRI as a case study. We especially appreciate 
the guidance given by the financial center at Wharton. However, the views expressed in this case are those 
of the author and are not necessarily those of NRI, the Wharton Center or their personnel. 
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 Here and in the other parts of the Sloan study, "software", "information technology (IT)" and "systems" 
are used interchangeably. In addition, when referring to a firm as a whole, the text uses "it", but when 
referring to its management, "they" is used. 
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and retailing are fairly clear and reflect the fact that its two largest clients account for 
about 50% of NRI's group revenues. 
Box 4 - An Overview of Nomura Research Institute (NRI) 
NRI is a large, diversified consulting and information services company with about 3800 group 
employees and almost $1.8 billion in revenues (Table 3). Through cross-shareholdings, it is 100% owned 
by the Nomura Group companies. The parent of the group is Nomura Securities, Japan's largest securities 
firm. The research institute part of NRI was founded in 1965 and the computer-center (Nomura Computing 
Center) in 1966. 
NRI considers itself to be "Japan's largest all-around information services company" comprising 
"think tank, consulting firm and SI [systems integration] vendor" (NRI 1998). Sometimes called Japan's 
first think tank, it is not one in the U.S. sense of an independently funded research institute only providing 
relatively unbiased public policy recommendations based on that research (Choi 1999). Rather, most of its 
research is done under contract for paying clients including Nomura Securities, producing economic or 
business analysis and forecasting. But NRI does provide policy recommendations by experts in their field. 
The bulk of its revenues, though, recently come from its work as a major software developer and 
IT systems provider. This is since the former NRI merged with its sister Nomura Group company, Nomura 
Computer Center, Inc. Two of its major IT clients are the Nomura Group and Ito-Yokado, a food retailer 
which, among other activities, controls the 7/11 convenience store chain (which has been quite successful 
in Japan; see Hibara & Rapp [2000]). Although NRI has research and computer systems businesses, this 
study focuses on the computer systems side and especially NRI's dedicated IT support activities for the 
Nomura Group companies and for Ito-Yokado. 
NRI's IT business includes Systems Solution Sectors for private-sector and government customers. 
These cover finance, industrial, data services, systems consulting, and solution products. Products include: 
Order Contract Management Systems; Securities Network for Electronic Messages; Trust Bank Disclosure 
Sharing Systems & Networks; Investment Trust Internet Marketing Systems; Investment Trust Marketing 
Support Systems; information & communications systems; total system operation services for customers 
and client-server network computing systems. This is combined with IT management consulting and 
system design for finance, distribution and manufacturing; and platform and system solutions to deliver 
competitive advantage through optimal utilization of the latest IT advances (Tables 5 and 6). 
NRI's Information Technology Research Laboratory is continually working on IT technologies 
that might help its clients. These activities include object-oriented technology, super-parallel computing, 
distributed processing, hypermedia, image recognition, user interfaces, and wireless systems (NRI 1997). 
The study illustrates how NRI is pushed to develop IT that can extend and deepen 
the competitive advantage of its two major clients. This is because growth in the Nomura 
Group's and Ito-Yokado's businesses expand NRI's own profits. Thus, to appreciate NRI's 
strategic purpose and its execution, Japan's financial services and retailing markets need 
to be examined in terms of their main economic characteristics and competitive 
pressures, even though this task is complicated. Yet, to keep the task in bounds, emphasis 
is placed on situations that, from NRI's perspective, seem to have the most impact on IT 
use by its two primary clients as well as on its own IT marketing strategies. 
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Box 5 - Why a Study of NRI 
This case began as a study of how Nomura Securities was using IT, but during the course of the 
research it evolved into a study of NRI for two reasons. 
First, the collapse of the Japanese bubble cost Nomura Securities its position as a leading Euro-
securities underwriter. It also was involved in several domestic scandals. In 1997 it took a large loss on an 
affiliate, Nomura Finance, which had been involved in Japanese real estate lending and speculation. In 
addition Nomura Securities incurred substantial losses in its U.S. real estate lending and commercial CMO 
activities in 1998-99. All this eroded its reputation and its business position (Desmond 1998). The firm was 
struggling to remain profitable even in Japan (Rapp 1999 and Tables 2 and 4) as it began to lose market 
share to more sophisticated foreign securities firms and money managers (Desmond 1998 and Choi 1999). 
NRI, on the other hand, was not involved directly in any of these developments, and the parent's 
relative weakness enabled NRI to pursue its own independent strategy. Through its successful evolution 
into one of Japan's leading systems houses, NRI became the star in Nomura's crown. This was based in part 
on its ability to sell trust and security reporting systems to a wide range of financial services companies, 
including foreign security firms and money managers that competed with its parent. But what most helped 
establish NRI's position as the number-two systems company in Japan after NTT was the successful IT 
support systems created for Ito-Yokado. NRI's success is summarized in Tables 3, 5 and 6. 
There is no comparable U.S. investment banking or computer systems case, given the uniqueness 
of NRI's franchise. However, several industries and firms were examined in this IT case study project. 
These are listed in Box 2 along with information on how to obtain copies of the studies. 
The Software Market in Japan 
In Japan, unlike the United States, most of the major systems houses are affiliated 
either with large users such as NTT, Nomura, and Nippon Steel (Enicom) or large 
hardware suppliers such as Fujitsu and Hitachi (Rapp 1995). Indeed, the very largest are 
subsidiaries of users such as NTT and Nomura. This is because, by the early 1990s, major 
Japanese users had established captive software companies to provide IT support to them 
and group-related companies while reducing average overhead costs including R&D and 
internal staff training through sales to unrelated companies. Indeed five of the top ten, as 
well as the two largest Japanese software and information service companies, are so 
affiliated (Rapp 1995 and JISA 1993a and 1993b). Because these group-related firms 
specialize in industry- and client-specific applications, they are not doing generic IT 
systems across the board as, for example, EDS does in the United States for hospitals or 
schools. 
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This corporate structure is seen by the parent companies as a way to control 
software costs but still build on proprietary, customized software systems specific to their 
firms and industries. At the same time, the approach provides independent career paths 
for each group's EDP professionals. (See Box 3 on the preference in Japan for 
customized software.) 
There is thus a dual IT business strategy and commitment that entails using 
significant computer, programming and financial resources to support parent and group 
requirements while soliciting outside business to partially defray the overhead cost of 
maintaining the group's proprietary systems through an expanded user base for similar IT 
services. Service and support sales to non-competing third parties usually are sought up 
to a limit of about 50% of revenues (Rapp 1995). 
User-related IT firms compete with the software subsidiaries of the major 
integrated systems producers, as well as large independent systems integrators. However, 
many of the latter are really independent in name only as they rely heavily on a particular 
client or industry for their work (Tsuboi 1996). Indeed, this is generally the only way that 
the independents can compete because user-related companies can leverage the stability 
of their cash flow and their existing systems' libraries. The major hardware producers do 
it as a way of selling their IT systems, often providing middleware that facilitates the 
integration of their hardware and operating systems or application programs with the 
client's proprietary system (Rapp 1995). 
This structure, when combined with the multiple operating systems that have 
existed in Japan since the 1960s, has resulted in a highly fragmented software market. In 
this market, foreign firms dominate operating systems (IBM, HP, Microsoft) and 
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horizontal applications such as networking and word processing (Oracle, Novell, 
Microsoft). On the other hand, Japanese firms dominate the vertical application or 
industry-specific IT market, which is often highly customized, as they tend to have 
significant user-industry expertise, often based on their parent affiliations.3 
It is this dominance by user's IT subsidiaries that helps keep software 
development in Japan highly fragmented and user driven (Rapp 1995). However, a 
fragmented market does not mean Japanese firms are not advanced in using IT to create 
an advantage. Indeed, Japan appears to be ahead of the United States in some vertical 
applications, especially when one considers possible tie-ins with software embedded in 
the product or service. Rather, for historical reasons the Japanese software market is just 
structured differently than the U.S. or Europe. 
This market structure does have several consequences, though. One is that it 
creates a high degree of specialization within the market for vertical application software 
and makes those IT providers very dependent on their group and major client affiliations, 
including the competitive dynamics affecting the group's industry. This in turn 
contributes to the perpetuation of the market's fragmentation. From an operational 
standpoint it also creates pressures on software providers and major users to reduce costs 
via reusable program segments (Cusumano 1991). 
This IT market structure does seem to work well in Japan and is thus a contrast to 
the United States, where the leading firms - such as EDS and Computer Associates - are 
truly independent and service a wide range of users and industries. Indeed, user-related 
3
 A third IT business may develop from NRI's ITS (Intelligent Transportation System) work for Toyota, as 
TMC and others think ITS related business may be a yen 60 trillion market by 2015 (Rapp 2000a). 
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firms have increased their share of the Japanese IT market as more large firms have 
formed such subsidiaries (Rapp 1995).4 
Any contribution to reduce a systems' overall cost is a plus, and that leads to 
average cost pricing for systems that can be modified easily for use by others. Such 
pricing drives independent developers and systems integrators from the market. As a 
result, many smaller independent systems development companies have gone bankrupt. 
This situation reinforces the trend toward captives in terms of market share and attracting 
technical personnel. This becomes a self-reinforcing loop, as systems development 
personnel who have good industry knowledge are in short supply. 
NRI's Relationship with Major Clients 
From this perspective NRI is a leading representative of Japanese IT firms' user 
orientation and focus on vertical application software. However, it represents an 
interesting mix of the two approaches to marketing such vertical application software, as 
the second largest source of its proprietary IT revenues come from a single client group 
(Ito-Yokado and affiliates) other than related Nomura companies. Still, NRI is typical of 
most IT subsidiaries in that most of its third-party sales are to financial services firms, i.e. 
related to its group's primary business.5 
As the IT-support group for each of its two major clients, NRI actively 
participates in these firms' IT-decision-making structures. NRI has dedicated groups that 
work closely with the two clients to solve their problems and provide, on a long-term 
4 The trend to form a software subsidiary or group-related affiliate was visible as early as 1992. A survey 
of major software users that year indicated that among firms with more than ¥500 billion in revenues, 54% 
had done, or planned to do, so. This compared to 28% for firms over ¥100 billion and 23% for those over 
¥50 billion. 
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basis, the IT systems support they need to meet their business objectives, including 
integrating new systems into the existing systems that NRI maintains and operates on 
their behalf. Because these are indefinite long-term relationships and the dedicated 
groups have total responsibility for the related systems, each dedicated group is a large 
stakeholder in this process and its interests and those of its major client are closely 
aligned. Therefore, each has a very strong incentive to create proposals that respond to 
requests by its client to solve that client's tough IT-requirements. This close interactive 
relationship is the source of NRI's strength. 
At the same time, NRI's dedicated cannot operate independently of the Nomura 
and IY business groups. It is these units that set the systems' performance requirements 
and the IT support tasks that must be fulfilled. Thus the two groups work closely together 
with the business units setting the IT requirements and budgets while NRI gets it done 
and operates the integrated systems. Although software is the essential element within 
NRI's overall business and management strategy with respect to delivering, marketing 
and servicing its customers worldwide, it looks at its information services more broadly. 
5 The Nomura Group generally is referred to simply as Nomura. When it is clear from the context, which is 
meant, Nomura Securities also is identified as Nomura. Ito-Yokado henceforth generally will be identified 
as IY. 
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Even its software and IT systems support can be delivered within a larger relationship 
(Table 6). Thus, for example, its objectives at Nomura include improving the functional, 
back-office, and branch office productivity; at IY, they include improving store and 
supply chain efficiency. In this way, IT systems are coupled with an approach to 
marketing, customer service, and constant cost reduction that reflects NRI's 
understanding of its major clients, their markets, and their competitive strengths within 
their respective industries as well as NRI's ability to work with them to achieve their 
corporate objectives. 
NRI has integrated this IT knowledge into a total support system within NRI that 
it operates for its clients. This includes related reporting interface functions to 
management and, in the case of Nomura, to government regulators. Further, by 
developing experience and expertise with respect to these systems it can extend its 
product offerings to address similar problems for other clients thus spreading the 
development costs over more users.6 However, any software developed on behalf of a 
client can only sold to another client if the original client gives approval to do so. 
This can benefit Nomura and IY (Table 6) too. 
NRI appears to have connected these objectives to its human resource, 
organization and financial reporting as well by creating dedicated groups for each of its 
two major clients. Each of the group's success depends on its ability to service its major 
client and personnel are committed on a long-term basis. At the same time, it maintains 
firewalls between groups and restricts inter-communication about client systems. (See 
Appendices I and II on Strategy and Operations as well as Firm Data.) According to NRI 
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what it has done is that it has enhanced its IT skills to efficiently conduct IT systems' 
development activities on behalf of Nomura and IY. These IT-skills are subsequently 
distilled into standardized IT skills that share some common IT approaches with the other 
leading software users examined by the Sloan project. These include creating large 
proprietary interactive databases that promote auto-feedback between various stages of 
the product marketing and service process (table 6). 
In the case of IY, especially, this has led to NRI's efficient development and 
operation of a system that significantly improves productivity through monitoring, 
controlling and linking every aspect of IY's sourcing and delivery of a product or service, 
including after-sales support and product changes. This new production paradigm has 
been termed "controlled production" (CP) (Hibara & Rapp 2000).7 
As illustrated in this paper for IY, the use of IT to achieve dramatic improvements 
in productivity and efficiency through controlling all aspects of a business is not limited 
to manufacturing: it also can significantly improve competitiveness in services. But 
controlled production is only possible when a firm actively uses IT systems continuously 
to monitor and control functions that previously were parts of a business structure that 
only responded to changes in expected or actual demand. Now a firm actually can 
influence or stimulate those changes. This may be why many see the skillful use of IT as 
important to some companies' success. 
Leveraging IT and Customer Advantages 
6 In an interview with Ito-Yokado in July 1998, IY indicated it normally gave NRI permission to sell 
aspects of its system to other clients two years after they had been introduced by IY. This is provided that 
NRI gave IY some benefit in terms the cost it pays to NRI for systems development and operations. 
'Traditional craft production was superseded by mass production, which dramatically improved 
productivity (and, often, quality) through economies of scale and using standardized products. Then came 
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The key to NRI's successful employment of IT is similar to the way other leading 
users examined in the Sloan study use and adapt IT to their business purposes. Thus, NRI 
develops and uses a mix of packaged and customized systems that support its clients' 
business strategies and differentiate them from competitors in ways that cannot be easily 
emulated. 
However, selling the exact same customized system to its major clients' rivals is 
not part of NRI's activities. In the case of Nomura, NRI only provides specialized 
brokerage and investment banking services to Nomura affiliates, and this is done through 
a separate dedicated division. There is also dedicated group within NRI for IY, and IY 
states that it requires a two-year gap in providing IT ideas and system developments to 
other retailers or multi-outlet food stores (footnote 6: Hibara and Rapp 2000). On the 
other hand, reporting, accounting and management systems that can be used by other 
securities and trust operations for record keeping without revealing proprietary Nomura 
data or Nomura proprietary knowhow are an excellent revenue source and a major 
business activity (Tables 5 and 6). However, these project accounts are totally separated 
and are operated by different dedicated groups. 
NRI has sought new clients where it can build on its functional strengths such as 
with insurance companies by applying the cutting edge IT knowhow it has accumulated 
in its R&D group to meet these users' requirements. Small and medium Japanese banks 
and insurance companies have financial tracking and reporting activities that mirror many 
of the routines already incorporated into the systems NRI has developed for Nomura 
Securities, and thus are a particular target. This is a target of opportunity because NRI 
lean production, which makes production more continuous and ties it more closely to actual demand. For 
more on this, see Rapp 1998; 1999a, Box 2. 
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can build on its functional strengths in IT management technique, especially in financial 
systems, to reduce the risks that arise from the new requirements and technologies for 
systems development facing these companies. NRI will then manage the system project 
for clients while training a user's employees to use it. For example, NRI sells an 
investment trust marketing system that was developed internally and then customizes it 
for many Japanese banks and insurance companies, including financial tracking and 
reporting activities. These experiences help enhance NRI's IT problem solving skills for 
its clients while building more experience to extend these activities further. Similar 
expertise will be needed to support IY's proposed on-line banking venture discussed later 
(Hibara and Rapp 2000). 
In approaching systems integration requests from third parties, NRI first assesses 
the possible uses of the software that it already has available. As an example, IY 
originally selected NRI to take over its systems development and support in the early 
1980s because IY felt that NRI's branch support system for Nomura was the closest to 
meeting IY's needs to support its various stores. 
Thus even NRI recognizes that IT systems are not always generic products that 
are best developed and maintained by outside vendors to achieve low costs through 
economies of scale and investment in the latest technologies. Sometimes, NRI is selective 
in its IT marketing and IT development, based on what it has already available, the cost, 
and the likely business impact on its clients. The last includes contributions to revenues 
through value-added and IT support services. One example of this is NRI's announcement 
in July 2000 that it was creating a new subsidiary to specifically help Japanese companies 
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with IT security generally, based on its expertise in financial services where security 
issues have always been paramount. 
Japanese Financial Services 
Industry Overview 
Several significant events since 1980 have defined the trajectory of Japan's 
financial services generally and the securities sector specifically. These include the 
Foreign Exchange Law liberalization (1980), the Yen-Dollar Agreement (May 1984), the 
Plaza Accord (September 1985), the late 1980s bubble, the bubble's early 1990s collapse, 
the failed 1996-97 recovery, the late 1990s Big Bang deregulation, and the pension crisis. 
This began with going global, or at least to London. The liberalization of the 
foreign exchange law in the early 1980s and the later Yen-Dollar Agreement served to 
open Japan's financial markets to foreign securities firms while giving Japan's largest 
corporations access to international capital markets. The changes in the foreign exchange 
law were a response to U.S. Treasury pressure to liberalize Japan's financial markets. The 
idea was to create more demand for yen, thus weakening the dollar. The revised laws 
shifted regulation from a negative to a positive system in that what was not prohibited 
was permitted. 
There also were changes in banking laws in 1981, in part as a response to active 
lobbying by non-Japanese banks and investment banks for market-opening measures. 
Among other things, the changes made it easier for foreign securities firms to obtain 
licenses. The result was that Japanese banks could make foreign currency loans. Both 
banks and large Japanese corporations could raise funds overseas. Japanese companies 
found they could raise funds more easily and cheaply abroad, especially in Europe. This 
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was true even if the buyers of the paper were Japanese financial institutions such as 
insurance companies. 
Prior to the September 1985 Plaza Accord, it was easy to buy U.S. Treasury bills 
and European government bonds in volume. Given high dollar interest rates compared to 
the return on yen assets, Japanese lenders, especially insurance companies, were anxious 
to build dollar portfolios, something they had not been permitted to do easily prior to the 
revised laws. But because they started with few foreign investments, the market impact 
was dramatic: these were huge institutions with the equivalent of billions of dollars to 
invest. However, they soon pushed their MOF regulated ceilings until a clever investment 
foreign investment banker realized the restriction on foreign assets only referred to the 
borrower. That is, insurance companies were restricted by the MOF in the amount of 
loans or other securities they could hold where the obligor was a foreign company. 
However, they were not restricted in the loans they could make or the securities they 
could hold if the obligor was a Japanese firm, even if the obligation of the Japanese firm 
was denominated in a foreign currency such as dollars. 
Therefore, Euro-dollar issues by Japanese corporations were not restricted. This 
innovation began the surge of innovative financing, regulatory arbitrage, and exploitation 
of market imperfections that characterized Japan's financial markets even into the 1990s. 
By the end of 1986, Japanese insurance companies held $223 billion in foreign securities. 
In this manner, the tremendous growth in Japan's financial markets in the 1980s first 
began to mesmerize almost everyone worldwide. 
Conversely, Japanese bank loan demand from large borrowers dropped 
precipitously. In 1983 only 29% of listed Japanese corporations' new funds came from 
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bank loans (compared to over 50% in the 1970s) while 32% came from bonds, and 39% 
from stock and convertibles (Rapp 1999). Further, due to slower economic growth, 
internally generated funds rose from 32% to 49% of total new financing. 
These developments increased profit pressures on both foreign and local banks, 
but made entry into Japan's securities business very attractive to the former while the 
latter were still precluded by Article 65, Japan's equivalent of Glass-Steagal. Also, the 
rapid rise in Euro-dollar investments and borrowing seemed to give foreign firms an 
advantage. Therefore, many foreign financial institutions, including the subsidiaries of 
several banks, entered the Japanese market, and licensed foreign securities firms jumped 
from only 4 in 1980 to 52 by 1990, while representative offices expanded this presence 
further since more than 100 other foreign securities firms had representative offices. 
Japanese securities firms, in contrast, had been consolidating, declining from 
1127 in 1949 to 220 in 1990. So in 1990 the number of licensed foreign firms represented 
20% of total licensed firms. However, Japanese banks and securities companies were not 
idle during this period, and in response to the same competitive and market pressures, 
they very quickly established offices in London. By 1989 Nomura was the number one 
Euro-underwriter in the world. This was despite the effects of the Plaza Accord, which, in 
1985, had dramatically increased the value of the yen. 
Although yen appreciation created large portfolio losses for the life insurers, the 
increase in Japan's current account surplus and the retention of money at home created 
the underpinnings for a rapid increase in liquidity and asset prices, which came to be 
known as the "Bubble". The ballooning trade surplus greatly increased the money supply 
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as companies converted dollars to yen, and the Bank of Japan permitted this increase in 
order to counter the deflationary effects of a strengthening yen. 
Large Japanese portfolio investors had stormed into foreign assets in the early 
1980s in response to higher rates, which kept the yen weak until the Plaza Accord. From 
late 1985, as they took billions in portfolio losses, these investors sought the safety of the 
yen by hedging their dollar investments, creating additional upward yen pressure, and by 
greatly increasing their demand for yen assets. 
Blowing a Bubble 
The excess liquidity thus found outlets in Japanese government bonds, real estate, 
and stocks. The investors were primarily large corporations, financial institutions, and 
wealthy individuals. In other words, no longer having attractive overseas investments due 
to exchange rate risks, excess savings and liquidity chased domestic assets, driving up 
their prices. The resulting capital gains created additional demand for similar yen assets. 
For instance, government bond trading, which had been ¥200 trillion to ¥500 trillion 
between 1980 and 1984, jumped to roughly ¥2,200 trillion in 1985 and peaked at ¥5,800 
trillion in 1987. 
The upward price spiral in yen assets was further exacerbated by the fact that the 
supply of Japanese bonds, real estate, and stocks was restricted. Historically, financial 
institutions had bought government bonds by direct placement and held them until 
maturity, which was why trading activity was rather limited. Similarly, people and 
companies did not sell real estate because taxes on the appreciated value were high and 
prices always went up. Finally, firms did not sell stock because the market had over time 
trended up and because of their stable cross-shareholding relationships. Indeed due to the 
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stability of inter-firm shareholdings, over time the proportion of stocks owned by 
institutions had risen; they were generally buyers. By the late 1980s, companies and 
individuals held 70% of Japanese stock for business purposes. 
Given the phenomenal appreciation in stock and real estate prices since World 
War II, one might have assumed that owners would resist this long-term commitment to 
such low-yielding, high-value assets. But, including appreciation, yields had actually 
been good and liquidity was not a problem because banks were prepared to lend against 
the appreciated values. Firms and individuals could borrow 80% to 85% of the market 
value of an asset used as collateral. Since corporate tax rates run 60% to 75% on land, 
borrowers could raise more cash through loans than by selling the collateralized assets. 
Conversely, the cost of carrying appreciated stock is zero and land taxes on use are low. 
For these reasons, annual real estate and stock turnover prior to the late 1980s was low. In 
addition, for many years government bond trading was restricted to the benchmark bond, 
which changed periodically to maintain a roughly ten-year maturity. To provide liquidity, 
this bond was usually the largest recent monthly issue. Other government bonds were 
priced off the benchmark. 
In summary, the supply of bonds, stock, and real estate was restricted at a time of 
increased liquidity and monetary easing. Declining interest rates then created capital 
gains for yen asset holders, stimulating more demand for such yen assets. This 
environment would have forced prices up more than normally in any case. However, the 
increase in asset prices caused investors to value companies based on their real estate and 
financial assets, bidding up their shares. Speculators then used stock gains to buy real 
estate, either selling shares or borrowing against the appreciated value. Profits and loans 
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on appreciated real estate were then used to buy more stocks and bonds, ratcheting both 
up as the bubble expanded. Since rising prices for bonds, stocks, and real estate affect all 
holders, this effect extended well beyond the immediate buyers and sellers, lifting the 
economy's borrowing capacity and paper wealth enormously. These interacting supply 
and demand phenomena for assets appear to be the immediate cause of the bubble. 
They also stimulated corporations to issue new equity. Listed companies issued 
equity-linked bonds or stock in 1987 of about ¥12 trillion, ¥14 trillion in 1988, and ¥24 
trillion in 1989. The number of convertible bond issues in Japan rose from 12 in 1980, to 
333 in 1988, and 295 in 1989. So as the stock market boomed, Japanese corporations 
issued the equivalent of billions of dollars in equity-linked Euro-bonds that, when 
coupled with yen foreign exchange swaps, often created negative interest costs. It was 
also a tremendous ride for Japanese securities companies, and Nomura in particular, 
which not only led Euro underwriting but also became Japan's most profitable company. 
Pricks to the Bubble Environment 
In May 1987, responding to strong overseas pressures, MOF granted permission 
to Japanese financial institutions to trade the Nikkei Index on the Simex (Singapore 
Exchange). In September 1988 the Osaka 225 index began trading and soon replaced 
Singapore as the volume leader, with about 10 times the contracts and about 20 times the 
volume. 
The resulting ability to hedge played a role in popping the bubble because it 
uncoupled a link in the support chain for high stock prices. This is because index futures 
increase the potential supply of securities, because anyone can create a futures contract or 
option. Any investor wanting to hold a group of stocks can purchase index futures or 
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options as an alternative to buying the stocks. Further, one can sell a portfolio without 
placing an order through the TSE. Indeed, using Nikkei and Topix index futures, any 
amount of stock can be created and then sold or bought without the demand-supply 
constraints that for so long had characterized the Japanese market and that had 
contributed to the near-vertical increase in stock prices. Indeed, a futures seller could now 
even be a "stable" shareholder who, because of the presence and expertise of foreign 
dealers, did not have to go through Japanese brokers. Financial institutions were thus no 
longer subject to the informal discipline of various business relationships, MOF, or the 
market. Further, banks had a capital-preservation incentive to hedge.8 
The insurers also had a similar hedging motivation after having successfully 
pressed MOF to allow them to include up to 25% of their capital gains as policy income. 
These previously stable shares were now salable via an index contract. For example, in 
1991 banks accounted for 18.7% of Nikkei futures trading and investment trusts were 
7.4%. The new instability was first signaled in December 1988 when a short-term 
downturn was exacerbated by futures market selling, but the lesson was lost in the 
subsequent market surge. 
8 In 1988, after two years of negotiation and under pressure from the United States and Europe, the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS), representing the major central banks, helped negotiate capital 
guidelines for large international banks. This was in response to Japanese banks' aggressive international 
push (related to decreased domestic loan demand) that was seen as "dollar dumping". Japan, however, 
insisted its banks be allowed to count a portion of the appreciation in their stock portfolios as tier-two 
capital. This was set at 45% to allow for tax effects. As a result, banks, along with other stable shareholders 
had a strong incentive to hedge their portfolios against a market downturn. 
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The real-estate prop for the bubble was removed about the same time. Spiraling 
prices had forced the government to act in 1988 by restraining bank real estate lending 
through administrative guidance and by activating the 1975 real estate pricing law, which 
allowed the government to set maximum prices for certain real estate sales. These actions 
began to rein in price appreciation. Thus "undervalued" real estate stocks would not 
appreciate either. 
The Bubble Pops 
After 1990 there was a weeding out process. Many domestic and foreign 
securities firms did not prosper, or even survive. Between 1990 and 1992, foreign 
registered securities firms decreased from 52 to 45, and only 15 firms accounted for most 
of the group of registered firms' profits. In 1993 County Nat West sold its seat on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange and departed. In 1994, Kidder Peabody simply closed its office; it 
could not find a buyer for its Japan operation. 
The Bank of Japan started raising interest rates in January 1990, and stock prices 
fell in response to less liquidity and the lower value of firms' portfolio assets. The futures 
market supply from stable shareholders increased, as they sold index contracts, bought 
index puts, and sold index calls. The stock market dropped precipitously. Their 
counterparties who were other market participants covered in the cash market, putting 
more downward pressure on stock prices. Rising interest rates increased the premium in 
futures contracts over the cash equivalent, further increasing downward pressure on the 
cash market. 
The index provided a good proxy for the extensive portfolios of the banks, 
insurers, and other large investors, stimulating index use. This contributed to the daily 
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cash trading value on the futures index market rising from ¥1.6 trillion to ¥2.2 trillion 
between 1990 and 1991 as the cash market fell from ¥846 billion to ¥504 billion. The 
primary traders and market makers were the foreign securities firms expert in all aspects 
of futures trading, not Japanese securities firms. 
MOF and the big four securities firms (Nomura, Nikko, Daiwa, and Yamaichi) 
viewed the futures market as influencing the stock market's collapse and foreign 
securities firms as providing support for this activity. But foreign brokers were not the 
large hedgers, though they did take positions for their own account. Rather, the hedgers 
were the large, stable Japanese shareholders. 
In the end, many banks and insurance companies were hurt as their unrealized 
portfolio gains largely disappeared (Rapp 1999, 1999b, 1999c). In addition, many banks 
had been realizing gains to offset lending losses, particularly to small and medium firms 
who had borrowed on the basis of real estate and stock values that had subsequently 
collapsed. Thus lenders were heavily affected by the bursting of the bubble, in which as 
much as $2 trillion in market value was lost, plus additional amounts in yen government 
bonds. 
The foreign securities firms and banks that had strong strategic positions in 
futures and derivatives continued to do well even though Japan's financial community 
was reeling. The six that were persistently profitable from 1989 through 1991 were all 
major derivative houses: Barings, Bankers Trust, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, 
Salomon, and Societe Generate. Their profitability and dominance was a function of their 
ability to arbitrage market imperfections, combined with the strong demand for these 
products by Japanese institutional and corporate clients trying to protect capital gains. 
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Together, in 1992 these leading six firms in terms of consistent profits accounted for 45% 
of the OSE Index arbitrage activity, compared to only 33% for all Japanese firms 
combined. 
The increased importance of derivatives and trading was also reflected in trading 
activity. Futures trading in Osaka (OSE) began in 1988 with a relatively steady monthly 
volume of about ¥1 trillion until the beginning of 1990 when the bubble began to burst. It 
then doubled and increased again by 50% in 1991. Conversely, TSE trading volume, 
which reflected demand in the cash market, dropped precipitously along with stock 
prices. The futures market in terms of value traded hit a high in 1991 with a daily average 
of ¥2.3 trillion, substantially exceeding the TSE's yen volume even at the height of the 
1989 boom. Although some activity was no doubt due to arbitrage between the cash and 
the index markets, a large part of index trading reflected hedging. (Otherwise greater 
volumes would have been traded in the cash market.) 
While the leading foreign derivative houses were reporting record profits, the 
listed Japanese securities firms reported losses for the period ending March 1992, except 
for Nomura and an affiliate, Kokusai. And they reported profits that were down 
substantially from the previous year: ¥30 billion versus ¥219 billion, ¥0.5 billion versus 
¥28 billion. 
Nor did the situation change much after 1992. The collapse of the bubble and its 
aftermath continued to depress the Japanese economy, the stock market, and real estate 
prices well into 1996, while the leading foreign securities firms continued to dominate 
derivatives and derivatives-related trading. This is because when asset inflation is 
coupled with asset-based lending, as it was in Japan, the results are explosive in terms of 
26 
an upward spiral in stock and real estate prices, and equally or even more dramatic falls 
on the downside. 
The Effect on the Banks 
The collapse had an especially large effect on the Japanese banks. A feature of 
Japan's successful economic growth and the bubble was that Japan's large companies no 
longer required Japanese bank financing. However, as domestic loan growth slowed, 
Japanese banks shifted their lending to smaller firms and especially those in real estate 
development domestically and overseas. This helped to fuel the bubble because, as real 
estate values climbed, the banks felt more comfortable extending larger loans. This 
resulted in the interactive compounding of lending capacity and asset inflation explained 
earlier. 
The bubble's bursting immediately decreased bank and real estate market 
liquidity, reducing bank lending capacity and impairing bank capital. Japanese banks 
could not easily sell real estate collateral, as no one had the funds to buy. The government 
then made the situation worse by thinking that the problems were cyclical, not systemic. 
Failing to appreciate the mature stage of Japan's economy and the financial sector's 
reduced liquidity, especially in disposing of real estate, it used fiscal and monetary 
stimulus. 
Meanwhile, Japanese lenders compounded their problems during the early 1990s 
by loaning funds to the emerging Asian bubbles. The net result was that weaker financial 
institutions, especially banks with illiquid real estate and large Asian loan portfolios, 
were totally unprepared for the failed 1996-97 recovery (Rapp 1999c). 
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The Aborted Recovery 
In 1996-97 Japan was finally starting to recover from the effects of the collapse. 
Between 1996 and 1997, GNP grew 3.9 % compared to an average 0.8% from 1993 to 
1996, while the manufacturing index (1990=100) rose to 101.8 in 1997 from 95.1 in 1995 
and 97.7 in 1996. Employment also grew by 1 million, and the Nikkei rose above 20,000. 
Imports and exports grew as well, though imports rose faster. However, export growth 
was mostly machinery to Asia, which further exposed the economy to a collapse in those 
regions. 
This is when the Japanese government made another huge policy mistake by over-
anticipating the strength of the recovery. Through a combination of fiscal restraint and an 
increased consumption tax, it took ¥9 trillion from economy at the same time that Asia 
was beginning its melt-down due to a decline in Japanese FDI (foreign direct investment) 
and related portfolio investment effects. Meanwhile, the economy was still too fragile 
from the illiquid real estate market and the huge (undisclosed) loan losses related to 
Japanese real estate and Asia to absorb this fiscal withdrawal. 
The aborted recovery led directly to several major bankruptcies and the economic 
malaise that has infected the country since 1998, further opening opportunities for foreign 
firms to enter Japan's financial markets. Some prominent examples of this are the failure 
of Yamaichi Securities and the absorption of many of its employees and offices by 
Merrill Lynch, the acquisition of Toho Life by GE Capital and the purchase of a 
nationalized LTCB (Long-term Credit Bank of Japan) by Ripplewood. Even firms that 
did not fail, such as Nikko Securities, have entered capital alliances, in Nikko's case with 
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a resurgent Citigroup and its Salomon Smith Barney investment banking and securities 
subsidiary (Rapp 2000).9 
Effect on Nomura 
As Japan's leading securities firm, Nomura and its group have been severely 
affected by these various developments. An immediate economic effect of the bubble's 
collapse was a halving of stock exchange trading volume (Ujie 1998), and substantial 
parts of that volume are trading and derivative related. Individual investors, a traditional 
Nomura market strength, have vacated the market. Liberalization beginning in 1985 has 
gradually decreased commissions for large equity traders; futures commissions are even 
lower. The failed recovery led to real estate lending losses in Nomura's finance affiliate 
of ¥371 billion (Tables 2 and 4). In the early 1990s a series of stories broke that Nomura 
had covered some large clients' trading losses after the bubble's collapse. These and other 
scandals cost the firm dearly in prestige, business, and fines (Nomura 1997). Public 
confidence in the firm and stocks was at a low until 1999. 
The mess in Japan's financial services sector ultimately moved the government to 
act. This has involved adding Japan to the list of economies greatly liberalizing financial 
markets. As part of this, in 1996 Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto announced what has 
become know as Japan's Big Bang under which, by 2001, virtually any Japanese financial 
service firm can offer any product at a price determined competitively. For example, life 
insurers will be able to offer brokerage services and commissions will no longer be fixed. 
9 For more detail on the effects of the bubble and Big Bang on Japanese banks and life insurance companies 
as well as the strategies of foreign financial firms in Japan, please refer to case studies in this series on 
Sanwa Bank, Meiji Life, and Citigroup (Rapp 1999c, 1999b and 2000). 
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In addition, non-financial companies such as Sony will be able to enter financial services 
via subsidiaries and in fact Sony has already established life and non-life insurance 
companies, while Meiji Life is offering accident policies through a non-life subsidiary 
(Rapp 1999b). These developments are all major challenges to Nomura. 
Given decreased investor interest and confidence in stocks, plus declining 
commissions, Nomura's traditional strength in stock brokerage and branch-related 
business can no longer be viewed as a long-term growth opportunity or even an annuity. 
Rather, Nomura has to meet the trading challenge presented by the successful foreign 
firms and look for new growth opportunities. 
Thus, in the 1990s Nomura began to develop a trading capability of its own. The 
success of this trading initiative is clear from Table 4. It also has moved aggressively into 
asset management, which is a growth opportunity that has emerged as a direct result of 
Japan's rapidly aging population. In 1997 Nomura's market share of issued trust 
certificates (the traditional Japanese equivalent of mutual funds) was in excess of 20%, 
the largest in Japan (Table 1). It is too early to tell about its success in other asset-
management products, given the number of competitors coming to Japan, the long-term 
nature of this market, and other factors (see Box 6). 
The Role of IT and NRI 
While both the Big Bang and the bubble's collapse have had significant negative 
consequences for Nomura, for NRI there have been benefits. The post-bubble recession 
weeded out many of the independent IT firms. Between 1991 and 1995, the number 
declined from about 7100 to 5800 (Tsuboi). The failed economic recovery of 1996-97 
eliminated several large financial services firms such as Yamaichi Securities and two of 
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the long-term credit banks (LTCB and NCB). The net effect was to strengthen captive IT 
firms such as NRI that had relatively strong parents and other strong major clients. 
Nomura's decision to emphasize trading and asset management also has been a 
plus for NRI. Trading and asset management require extensive IT support and 
development both to manage trading and investment portfolios and to provide back office 
support. There is also significant leverage in trading, and Nomura needs to manage the 
associated risks carefully.10 
One purpose of these systems is to use IT to institutionalize certain necessary 
procedures and routines to reduce operational and human risk. This can be a particularly 
critical issue in some emerging markets when those markets are subject to heavy trading 
volumes. Since continuous reporting is part of Nomura's risk management and 
operational controls, the whole process requires sophisticated real-time IT-support. That 
is, the system must be able to evaluate and report on the actual situation with respect to 
all aspects of Nomura's trading and asset positions at any time. 
There also are regulatory requirements that must be met both in Japan and 
overseas markets, such as risk capital usage that must be reported daily. More extreme, in 
many cases Nomura's management must know what are the quantified risks the firm has 
assumed on a moment-to-moment basis. On the back-office side, Nomura has 
computerized a substantial portion of the order execution process and cut paperwork, 
thereby reducing the potential for the execution of fraudulent or illegal transactions. 
10
 Notional or gross contractual derivative contract exposure, over 90% of which was trading related, 
amounted to ¥12,867 billion yen at the end of 1996 and has grown since. 
Derivatives activities require particularly sophisticated IT support, including mark-to-market and 
value-at-risk management, as well as monitoring of counterparty exposures. Powerful IT also is required to 
manage Nomura's balance sheet in terms of loans, securities inventory, and non-trading assets (for example, 
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Box 6 - Nomura as an Asset Management Firm 
Nomura faces significant challenges in establishing credibility in the asset management market 
because of the performance of its own offerings (and those of other by Japanese firms). During the period 
of stock price growth from 1981 to 1992. Japanese mutual funds on average under-performed the stock 
indices by at least 7 percentage points annually. There is disagreement among experts as to the reason for 
such poor performance. Cai and Chan (1997), argue it is due to high fees combined with high trading costs, 
churning, and lackluster portfolio management. Brown et al (1998) believe it is due to dilution created by 
new contributions based on per share NAV after allowing for accumulated taxes owed by current 
participants. 
Public perception certainly is that local fund managers are weak and self-serving, and this has 
meant Japanese mutual funds have seen outflows. Meanwhile, foreign-managed funds are growing (K&M 
1998). This also applies to pensions. Foreign firms also are working to market wrap accounts that include 
mutual funds (Cerulli 1999). 
The opportunity is huge: Bernstein Research (K&M 1998) projects a potential $24 trillion 
Japanese pension funding asset shortfall relative to future requirements. This creates a tremendous 
opportunity as firms seek to reduce the potential impact of unfunded pension liabilities on reported profits 
by improving returns on pension assets despite low interest rates. In addition, individuals will seek to 
supplement retirement savings in an uncertain pension environment through increased savings or the 
recently introduced 401(k)-type plans. 
The effects of the Big Bang will greatly expand the competition for this business. For example, 
several insurers and banks are already developing relationships with experienced domestic and foreign 
asset managers. Examples are Yasuda Fire & Marine, Yasuda Trust, Yasuda Life, and Fuji Bank's plans 
jointly to sell investment trusts; Tokyo Fire and Marine's agreement with Meiji Life, Mitsubishi Bank, and 
Mitsubishi Trust to develop pension and investment trusts. Among foreign tie-ups are Nippon Life's plan 
with Putnam Investments to manage trusts and assets, CIGNA's plan to cooperate with Yasuda Fire & 
Marine to market pension and investment products; Metropolitan Life and Asahi Mutual's agreement to 
provide investment management services; and Chiyoda's marketing of Unum's long-term disability product 
(Rapp 1999b). 
To support Nomura's global activities, NRI's operations division manages an 
extensive computer operation consisting of mainframes that control several servers and 
communications controllers, as well as an extensive VAN that covers both Japan and 
overseas. These are backed up through NRI's four linked centers in Japan, combined with 
satellite links to its computer centers in New York, Hong Kong, and London. Since 1993 
NRI's Securities Systems Division I, which manages Nomura's IT support systems, could 
claim to be operating the "World's Largest On-Line System". 
During fiscal 1996 and 1997 Nomura Securities responded to business and 
economic pressures by working to reduce overhead, including real estate and computer 
services provided by NRI. In 1995 Nomura launched its BPR (Business Process Re-
the cross-shareholding portfolio). NRI also has worked with Nomura to develop risk management models 
32 
engineering) Project "to raise the level of efficiency in Nomura's sales and back-office 
operations and in management decision-making through the introduction of a 
decentralized computer network for use by its sales and back-office personnel."11 This 
project resulted in a decrease in IT related rental, depreciation, and maintenance 
expenses. 
The work for Nomura has helped support NRI's non-Nomura IT business, which 
sales were made more important by Nomura's cut-backs. Because small and medium 
financial services firms have been subject to the same competitive pressures, they have 
moved in a direction similar to Nomura in terms of product offerings. They thus are 
subject to similar risk control and reporting requirements. Also, foreign asset managers 
that have responded to Japan's pension crisis must meet various Japanese accounting 
standards, legal procedures, and regulatory requirements. It makes sense for both groups 
to purchase existing software and associated IT support rather than to develop their own. 
NRI's Securities Systems Division II in Japan has been able to provide foreign 
and domestic second-tier and medium securities companies with a range of information 
services, including systems operations. The Systems Research Division has developed 
systems for assessing and managing trading and portfolio investment operations. Further, 
Nomura Securities has approved the marketing to Non-Nomura companies of several of 
the IT-services that had originally been developed for Nomura by NRI. One example is 
the STAR system that is a joint-use total system service that supports securities business 
conducting branch operations and was developed and operated by NRI. It is provided to 
that are localized for various markets, especially London and New York. 
11
 One BPR result is that now "each Nomura salesperson is equipped with a personal computer that is 
connected to Nomura's central host computers and local servers on a real-time, on-line basis. This 
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any (Non-Nomura) company who is willing to purchase the service from NRI. This can 
be combined with support from the Financial Information Services Division, which offers 
systems that help manage risk, measure performance and manage portfolios. The 
Financial Systems Division extends this support to insurance companies (life and non-
life), trust banks, investment trusts, trust agents, and investment advisory companies. 
Asset management is widely seen as a huge opportunity - indeed, the opportunity 
in Japan. The country has the largest gap between pension requirements and funding, and 
local competition is weak (Cai and Chan 1997; Krawcheck and Medler 1998). NRI can 
assist asset managers through economic forecasting, as well as industry and corporate 
research. So at the same time that the entrance of new players has created competition for 
Nomura Securities it is creating more customers for NRI (Table 5). And NRI can expand 
its system development business beyond that created by its 2 major clients. 
E-trading of a sort was introduced by Nomura, with NRI's support, in December 
1996, with "Fundnet", an investment-trust marketing channel for those who do not need 
face-to-face assistance. Customers can call a toll-free number for a starter kit. This was 
followed in January 1997 with of an on-line brokerage service, "Nomura Home-Trade" 
that uses personal computers or computer-game machines to access accounts for current 
and historical data as well as securities prices and market or investment data. 
This new set of services in turn has some connections with NRI's evolving work 
and IT system's support for its other big client, Ito-Yokado. 
Multi-Outlet Retailing - Industry Overview 
salesperson can use [a] personal computer to promptly determine the suitability of a particular financial 
product for a particular customer prior to taking an order." 
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Like other leading IT users, Ito-Yokado's (IY) business and IT strategies are 
driven by the specifics of its competitive situation, as well as by its desire to change those 
dynamics. In particular, it expects financial services to be an important activity going 
forward. To appreciate the sophistication of IYs approach, its effort's three principle 
components, and NRI's support, it is helpful to understand some general trends in 
Japanese retailing. The three parts of this joint effort are IY's general management 
strategy and its use of IT; its strategy for its general merchandise stores (GMS); and IY's 
separate strategy for its Seven-Eleven Japan (SEJ) convenience stores (CVS). These are 
taken up in terms of NRI's involvement after an overview of Japanese GMS and CVS. 
Japan's retail market is about ¥143 trillion including automobiles and consumer 
electronics. However, IY's current marketing focus is on two sectors: general 
merchandise supermarkets and convenience stores. Japan's GMS sales are estimated at 
about ¥10 trillion, while CVS sales are about ¥8 trillion. 
General Merchandise Stores (GMS) 
Two annual rates of growth show the performance of GMS: sales and floor space. 
Sales in the 1980s grew between 2% and 5% annually, while floor space grew between 
2% and 4%. This reflects the good economic conditions in the market prior to the 
bubble's bursting. But after that, things changed: 1991 was the last year that GMS had a 
positive spread between sales and floor space growth. Sales growth decreased rapidly in 
1992, actually becoming negative, while floor space increased to a rate over 4%, and then 
jumped to above 10% in 1993. 
The reason for this was the liberalization in the Large Scale Retail Store Law that 
began in 1990. In the 1980s the number of large retail stores grew slowly from 400 to 
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700. However, the number jumped above 1500 in 1990 after liberalization began, and 
rose steadily from there, reaching 2269 in 1996. Individual stores began to experience 
heavy competition. The firms have had to develop new strategies. There have been four 
aspects to this: pricing and merchandising, reducing operating costs, using information 
technology, and strategic site selection. 
Pricing and merchandising strategies include efforts to sell more imported and 
private-label products. For example, imports accounted for 17.8% of IY's sales in 1996 
and 19.5% at Jusco, while at Daiei, private brands accounted for 12.8% of revenues in 
1995. It has been more difficult to lower operating costs as compared to CVS or the 
discount centers that have moved into rural areas. This is because GMS have to bear the 
relatively higher level of inventories required as well as the initial investment cost of 
opening new stores. CVS especially have a more limited inventory and franchisees 
frequently own an existing establishment, reducing opening costs. 
The primary cost reduction strategy that remains is to find the best way for each 
store to control inventory. In particular, attention has been given to avoiding non-
availability, or lost opportunity sales, that is, losing a sale because something is out-of-
stock (or not carried at all). This is why good IT strategies have become important to 
GMS profitability and success. 
Point of sales (POS) information has been available in Japan for several years; 
what is important now is how to design a system that covers all aspects of a firm's 
business activities, including using POS and other information to control inventories. 
Stores have found that such thorough command of IT systems can help avoid having 
shelves stocked with unpopular goods, as well as better identify what merchandise 
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consumers really want at a given time. For example, demand at a given store can vary 
depending on the time of the day and the weather. This information can also be used to 
identify the best time to order from producers or wholesalers. Just as manufacturing has 
moved to being "lean", so too is there "lean retailing".12 
Good IT systems can help achieve the best balance among low inventory, high 
turnover, and few lost sales. Optimally managing these variables is the key to a GMS 
firm's success, and explains why IY's leading edge IT strategies, developed jointly with 
NRI, have contributed to its success in this highly competitive market despite Japan's 
economic malaise. 
Convenience Stores (CVS) 
The competitive advantage from using IT has been even more dramatic at the 24-
hour SEJ stores. CVS in Japan generally have enjoyed relatively better performance than 
GMS in the 1990s. While the GMS have experienced declining sales due to increased 
competition and the economic downturn, sales of existing CVS dropped only 0.4% in 
1995 compared to 1994. 
Competition within the class and against other retail sectors has been increasing. 
The time is gone when the whole sector could enjoy huge growth opportunities. Now 
only the better managed CVS and those that can add new services have a chance to grow 
faster. Therefore, in 1996 when deregulation allowed them, SEJ and other CVS added 
payment services and such things as stamp sales and package delivery. With that, sales of 
existing CVS began rising again. As the Big Bang has progressed, there have been 
several announcements that the CVS will act as automated bank branches. Thus, SEJ will 
l2 Abernathy et al (1999), the result of another Sloan project, looks at the relation of lean retailing and lean 
manufacturing in apparel and textiles. 
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team with NEC, Nomura Research (NRI), Sony, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Sanwa 
Bank, Nomura Securities, and Nikko Securities (part of Citigroup) to offer not only 
automated cash services but access to on-line brokerage and Sony's new life and auto 
insurance products. Sony has also concluded an agreement to offer game downloading 
capabilities for its popular Play Station game consoles. 
These kinds of initiatives, when combined with the liberalization of the Large 
Scale Retail Store Law and depressed economic conditions, have caused real problems 
for small and medium family retail stores. It also has given them strong incentives to join 
the franchise network of a chain. A small family store licensed to sell liquor has a 
particular advantage, and the chains have offered good terms in such cases. As a result, 
more than one-half the new franchise stores have liquor permits. In 1996 SEJ had a net 
increase in franchise stores of 502, a record level. 
With the surge in the number of CVS, the population per store fell to 2,572 in 
1996, which is below the 3,000 usually regarded as the critical competitive level. In the 
major urban areas the situation is even more unfavorable: in Tokyo, 2,012; in Osaka only 
1,819. However, it is important to distinguish between high-quality stores and lower 
quality ones that are called CVS just because they are open 24 hours. That is, the total 
number of CVS in Japan, 48,567, includes every type that satisfies the minimum 
definition. Of these, only about 32,000 are providing the other usual CVS services. 
Therefore, the population per high-quality store may actually be around 4,000. This 
means that, for quality operations, there may be a chance to add as many as 10,000 stores. 
Still, at the current rate of additions, that point will be almost reached by 2001. 
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Competitive pressures are indicated by the fact that low-quality stores that do not 
belong to a franchise are closing. In 1996 there were 1,486 such closures, equal to 45% of 
the 3,218 newly opened stores. Though the five listed CVS companies are doing some 
scrap-and-build of their existing franchise stores, the number of scrapped stores per listed 
CVS has been only some 100 per year, about 20% of new openings. Therefore, the share 
of stores related to the listed CVS companies and Lawson (a subsidiary of Daiei, Japan's 
largest chain of discount stores) has been rising since the mid-1980s. It went from 21.4% 
in 1985, to 29.6% in 1990, to 40.3% in 1995, and 42.8% in 1996 (Table 8). Thus by 1996 
their share was almost twice that in 1985, and the CVS market has become an oligopoly. 
The major chains are moving into a more intensely competitive environment. In 
this situation, performance will depend not just on location but on their strategies. 
Examining this from the same perspective as for GMS, the following are important. First 
is merchandising strategy, including the various services offered; second is the use of IT; 
third is strategic site selection; and fourth is owner development. In this regard, further 
deregulation definitely will increase the kinds of merchandise and services CVS can 
offer. Many CVS have fax and copier services and provide pick-up and drop-off for 
delivery companies. Sales of rice and stamps were allowed in 1996. Reservation services 
for travel packages are expected, and the stores in the future may even be able to sell 
prescription pharmaceutical products. 
In addition to being payment points for electricity, gas, and water since 1987, 
there will be other banking and financial services as deregulation continues. For example, 
foreign exchange services started in April 1998. Working couples needing financial 
services outside normal banking hours have already been targeted by firms such as 
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Sanwa Bank in terms of their expanded automated branch network (Rapp 1999c). This is 
one reason IY has applied for an on-line banking license (Hibara and Rapp 2000) and 
further indicates its close relationship with NRI, which has extensive IT support 
experience both for IYs stores and financial service firms of all kinds. 
Handling this wide range of services requires thought, support, and staff training. 
For example, when CVS started selling game software in 1996, the makers selected 
stores based on distribution power. This in turn depends on how large the franchise 
network is, and on how well the distribution system works. The implication is that 
although a CVS can offer many more items and services, not all chains may be able to do 
it well. Further, many of these new products and services, especially financial ones, are 
very IT intensive. The store ideally wants the customer to buy lunch, a snack and 
magazine for later, and a toiletry while checking bank balances, making payments, or 
trading stocks. 
POS data, local weather, and event information in the neighborhood are even 
more critical to CVS sales than for a GMS. This is because the number of items (SKUs) 
at a CVS are far fewer than at a GMS (30,000 items versus over 100,000), and many 
items at a CVS are fast food, much of which has a shelf life measured in hours. Thus, the 
daily demand forecast is much more important. Therefore, such events as a wedding or 
local "matsuri" (festival) can significantly impact the sales of a given store as well as the 
items demanded at a given time. 
As for site selection, the best strategy for a CVS firm is to focus on a small area 
and to have as many stores within it as possible while avoiding super-saturation. This is 
called "area-dominance". Selection of franchisees is closely related to site selection, and 
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is considered the most important aspect of CVS strategy. This is because the increased 
competition among CVS firms for new franchise stores in promising areas has reduced 
the average quality of franchisees and CVS stores. 
At some CVS chains, the staff responsible for developing new stores and advising 
new franchise owners on store management are not very competent. Competence is very 
important when more complex services related to finance, travel and automobiles are 
added. Because franchise-closing costs are much higher than opening costs, CVS firms 
will have to pay careful attention to their relations with franchisees. 
The Role of IT and NRI 
Although IT is not the sole strategic criteria needed for GMS or CVS success, in 
the current intensely competitive environment it is clearly a critical element needed for 
inventory control, supply ordering, and customer profiling, as well as services related to 
package delivery, payments, and video games. It will become even more important as the 
large CVS move into IT-intensive areas such as financial services, car rentals, and web 
access.13 
Because IT directly ties each store or franchise owner with corporate 
management, it is the primary link between the various strategic elements that impact the 
company. IY realized very early that maintaining and improving this advantage is the key 
to its competitive success against the other large GMS and CVS. This is why IY's 
corporate strategy and the IT groups at NRI for systems and NEC for hardware are so 
closely tied together on an interactive basis. 
13
 For a detailed explanation of IY's IT strategy in the context of Japanese retailing see Hibara and Rapp 
(2000). Only part of the study is summarized here. 
41 
It also is why the company has been far ahead in using IT since 1982, when it 
decided to eliminate slow-selling goods from its shelves with an inventory control system 
pioneered in Japan by SEJ. Using technology developed in the United States, the 
company read bar codes at the cash register and constantly checked the popularity of 
every item in the store. This detailed, item-by-item, information was then uploaded to a 
central computer to help the company decide whether to continue stocking an item or to 
cancel an order. 
The data also were sent to the wholesalers, distribution centers, and manufacturers 
supplying IY stores. For the system to function smoothly, wholesalers and other suppliers 
needed to have compatible information systems. IY has tried to drop inefficient 
wholesalers and suppliers while requesting that the remaining ones invest in IT systems 
capable of meeting IY requirements. It was difficult for many of them to make the large 
investment needed, but they could not refuse if they wanted to keep IY business. Most 
who made the investment and met IY's high standards benefited from the quick automatic 
feedback of precise sales data supplied via their links to IY's system. Manufacturers 
benefited from more timely understanding of what customers wanted. 
Because its system helped prevent the accumulation of large inventories, IY in 
1990 declared it would no longer return unsold merchandise, an unprecedented move for 
a Japanese retailer. Mr. Suzuki, IY's president, thus assumed the risk of keeping unsold 
products and sometimes offering discounts. Because IY was assuming inventory risk, it 
could receive lower prices. IY could thus offer shoppers lower prices and still earn higher 
margins, a beneficial loop. 
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IY has been selling more private-label goods and has tried to improve and add to 
its ability to develop new products. The precise data gathered by its IT system has been 
invaluable in indicating potentially popular new products, as well as those not selling 
well. IY is taking steps to develop new merchandise by itself or in cooperation with 
foreign counterparts based on the wealth of information it has about consumer tastes and 
consumption habits by store and time of day. SEJ first succeeded with this strategy with 
fast food and box-lunch manufacturers, and IY has extended the approach to its GMS. 
In the initial case, SEJ met with the box-lunch producers once a week to discuss 
new products based on an analysis of its customer database. If, for example, the 
discussants decided to have three varieties of chicken box-lunches, IY would share 
information on how to make these with all producers, requesting each to create the same 
menus and provide them to all SEJ stores. This kind of activity is why Mr. Suzuki's feels 
SEJ has been dominating the market in terms of how to use IT systems to develop new 
merchandise and drive retail operations. 
Other SEJ strategies that are critically supported by its IT systems are the frequent 
deliveries of fresh food, using different trucks for frozen, chilled, warm and room-
temperature goods, and constantly reviewing and revamping product lines. Mr. Suzuki is 
pushing IY's GMS in a similar direction. That is, in cooperation with outside parties, each 
GMS and CVS store can now provide unique products and services to a consumer market 
that is changeable. 
It is not just goods that require such extensive IT support, but also some services. 
For example, delivery services such as the affiliation with Yamato (Black Cat) or 
financial services such as the tie-up announced with NRI, Sony, NEC, Bank of Tokyo-
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Mitsubishi, Sanwa Bank, Nikko, and Nomura Securities require sophisticated IT to track 
deliveries or securely access financial networks. In addition, there is the IT support 
needed to implement the agreement with Sony to download games or music from a 
central computer. 
The method Mr. Suzuki uses to achieve this integration of expertise and IT to get 
a positive business result is to force managers to make their own plans, and then 
outsource the actual making of the hardware and software. Thus, IY people have to work 
out and exactly explain their needs to outside technologists. It is the dedicated units at 
NRI and NEC that actually develop, implement, and manage the integrated software and 
hardware system. NRI and NEC have provided IY with systems support and terminals for 
more than 20 years. Mr. Suzuki, when he was president of SEJ, arrived at this 
outsourcing decision in the early 1980s as one aspect of IY's IT strategy partly because 
IY decided to focus its IT personnel mainly on planning activities. But, as it has evolved, 
it has brought many benefits to IY, as well as to NRI where IY is now its second largest 
client after the Nomura Group. These benefits are manifested in the various ways SEJ is 
using IT to achieve its strategic objectives and its apparent outpacing of any other 
company in the IY Group or retailer in the United States. 
Fifth-Phase System 
Since 1978, SEJ has had five phases in upgrading its IT system. The fifth stage 
started in November 1997. It is based on extensive use of POS data for efficient ordering 
practices and inventory control. POS data inputs from each store are output in three 
formats. The first covers sales of each SKU in a merchandise or service group for the 
previous 24 hours. Take, for example, rice balls, and assume seven varieties. A graphic 
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screen displays the quantity of each variety on the vertical axis and the time of sale on the 
horizontal axis. This makes it possible to detect periods of peak sales. The graphic also 
indicates the number of customers visiting the store at any time, so one can appreciate 
possible relationships between a product's sales and the number of customers in the store 
at a particular time, which is also tracked by store personnel. 
The second format also looks at individual items in a group, but covers longer 
time periods. Again take rice balls. The relevant SKUs are displayed in rank order 
according to sales for the past one week or four weeks. The screen also displays the 
relative amounts sold of each item or type of rice ball within the rice ball group. This 
kind of information is useful for the store staff to select and order items during a one-
week period from all items that can be ordered within a product group such as rice balls. 
The third format monitors items that, to retain freshness, are delivered to each 
store several times during the day (such as rice balls, which arrive three times a day). The 
goal is to balance wastage against out-of-stock. The graphic displays sales quantity, the 
time an item sold out, and the quantity thrown away if an item does not sell out between 
specific deliveries. In this way store personnel can track patterns in the times during the 
day or week in which specific items do or do not sell out. They can then change ordering 
patterns accordingly. 
In addition to such processed POS data, headquarters provides information on the 
weather, neighborhood events, and other external factors in order to increase each store's 
ordering efficiency. The fifth-phase system has introduced multi-media as well, to make 
the information more visually accessible. Processed POS data and external information 
support the estimating, ordering, and review process at each store. 
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The overall process makes the following efficiencies possible. First, stores can 
discontinue slow-moving items. Second, stores can narrow the items and services offered 
to those items their customers actually want to buy, maximizing the use of limited floor 
space. Third, the first two effects create more shelf-space so the stores are better able to 
introduce new products and services. The result is shelves that always look attractive to 
customers. 
The benefits of this increasingly sophisticated IT system are reflected in SEJ's 
outstanding business performance since 1977 in terms of gross profit margin per store, 
daily sales per store, and inventory turnover (Tables 7 and 8). 
Supplier Relations 
IT and its application to retail businesses have been significantly transforming the 
relationships between retailers and suppliers across the world. SEJ has been quite 
successful in its supplier relations. Indeed, its remarkably strong cooperation with 
suppliers in providing attractive fast food, such as box-lunches, rice balls, and 
sandwiches, as well as fresh foods and fruits, have made it the number one fast food 
outlet in Japan, even ahead of McDonalds. This experience has helped NRI to develop 
the expertise needed to extend its IT support to other clients in such businesses as multi-
outlet restaurant chains. (See Box 7.) 
Box 7 - NRI and Food Retailing 
NRI offers a set of integrated IT services for "supermarkets, convenience stores, family-type 
restaurants, and other chain stores that supply a large variety of products in small quantities". To quote NRI 
marketing material, NRI will help identify a firm's IT needs and then build and operate the system so that 
the firm can assume an "aggressive management style". This includes building inter-enterprise networks 
and large-scale database systems that help the firm identify and manage consumer consumption patterns 
and behavior. 
NRI's POS Information analysis system "collects and stores information generated at retail outlets 
and provides an information analysis environment from many viewpoints and with a great deal of freedom 
in a client-server format". This "supports a flexible hypothesis-execution-verification cycle". NRI also 
provides a "cyber catalogue system" and various systems to support "corporate activity, which is capable of 
dynamically adjusting to market changes and achieving efficient operation of the global supply chain 
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(procurement-production-marketing)". This type of business has gradually evolved during the 1990s. 
The fresh food business has been quite profitable for IY even though all these 
items can perish during the day. The key to IY's success has been in how it has overcome 
possible conflicts with or among its suppliers. Most of SEJ's suppliers of fast and fresh 
daily food are smaller companies that don't supply national-brand fast food. Although 
such firms may have less concern over joining with a specific retailer, other conditions 
must be met to have cooperation work well in practice. This is because SEJ requires very 
timely delivery, as well as maintenance of quality and taste. 
Yahagi (1994) has described some of the conditions needed for this system to 
function well, and calls the arrangement between SEJ and its suppliers a "closed system". 
Such closed systems are characterized by relation-specific investments by suppliers, a 
high concentration rate of the suppliers' business with the buyer, and an open and fair 
reward system that shares benefits. This is analogous to Toyota's relationship with its 
suppliers (Rapp 2000a). 
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E-Commerce 
In a similar development involving external suppliers and participants, with NRI's 
help IY is moving quickly and decisively to have an impact on the development of e-
commerce, first in Japan and then elsewhere. NRI clearly understands this development 
and its importance, as is reflected in NRI's promotion of "cyber" commerce. A key area 
in making cyber or e-commerce work is in developing convenient and secure payment 
mechanisms. This is an advantage for convenience stores. NRI started its R&D in this 
area in the early 1990s and through field experiments it has developed the SET (Secure 
Electronic Transfer)-based credit and debit card settlement system, which is an electronic 
cash, verification, and billing system for Internet micro-transactions. These micro 
transactions can be linked to funds settlement systems between companies that NRI also 
has developed and operates. This includes global supply chain management systems and 
settlement systems between related companies. 
E-commerce is definitely taking hold in Japan, although it may evolve differently 
than in the United States. It will definitely change Japanese retailers' strategies. In fact, it 
may by-pass many traditional functions of retailers, because it may be that consumers 
will directly order food and other merchandise over the Internet and have it delivered 
through a convenience store. This is the idea behind a new caregiver service where SEJ 
proposes to deliver meals to the elderly. 
It is already popular to order some items such as books, video games, and CDs 
through the Internet using the CVS for payment and delivery. In fact IY has already 
started to respond to, and lead, this change. In 1999 SEJ established joint ventures such as 
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E-Shopping Books with Softbank, Tohan, and Yahoo Japan, and Car Points for car sales 
with Softbank, Microsoft, and Yahoo Japan. 
In a press release in January 2000, SEJ and NRI announced the formation of a 
new company, which the casewriter defines as an "e-retsu" company or firm based solely 
on IT relationships. This new company has a capital of ¥5 billion and is called 
'7dream.com". Its purpose is to develop the potential of e-commerce (EC) in Japan. 
Intended to be "one of the largest EC businesses in Japan and operate at the forefront of 
its field", it is a joint venture of SEJ (51%), NEC (13%), NRI (13%), Sony (6.5%), Sony 
Marketing (6.5%), Mitsui & Co (6%), JTB (2%), and KINOTROPE (2%). 
7dream.com will provide an expanding range of services by first creating a 
website, followed by placement of multimedia terminals in SEJ stores. However, in 
keeping with NRI's recommendations that any e-commerce access strategy be 
"ubiquitous", in addition to the terminals in SEJ stores, 7dream will offer access through 
other networks, including those open to mobile phones, PCs, and direct TV. It will also 
operate an expanded call center. 
The new firm initially will offer services related to travel, music, gifts, mobile 
phones, event tickets, books, car-related services, and information. NEC will build and 
operate the website, as well as design and develop the multimedia terminals, all of which 
will be connected via dedicated lines. NRI will advise on structuring the business, as well 
as develop and operate the e-commerce system. Sony will supply technological support 
related to its MD (Mini-disk) and IC (Integrated Circuit) card technologies, including on-
line packaged music. Mitsui & Co will provide information, general merchandising 
support, and distribution services. JTB (formerly Japan Travel Bureau) will contribute 
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travel services. KINOTROPE will consult on Internet business design and systems 
development. 
Some other connections and services the new venture is considering include: sales 
of reserved tickets, same-day tickets, tickets to major events (including a tie-up with PIA 
Corporation); sales of books through an arrangement with E-Shopping! Books Corp; car 
services such as sales via CarPoint or acting as an agent for auto inspections and repairs, 
driving schools, and rental car agencies; and information services related to entertainment 
information, digital photographs, and special examinations in partnership with firms such 
as Toppan Printing and JMA Management Center. 
SEJ expects start-up costs to be around ¥40 billion and projects annual sales of 
about ¥150 billion for 2002 and ¥300 billion for 2004. This obviously offers IY 
tremendous opportunities to enlarge the goods and services available at SEJ stores. It also 
significantly extends NRI's IT business and expertise. 
As a further extension of its e-commerce strategy, SEJ and NRI jointly have 
started providing clearing services for purchasing through the Internet. In addition, the 3 
million customers of Japan's largest virtual mall, Rakuten Ichiba (rakuten.co.jp), can use 
7/11s to make their payments. This is all part of a customer-driven strategy in which the 
concept of convenience goes well beyond the types of items one normally has associated 
with such outlets. 
Because IY maintains extensive databases on their customers spending habits, 
analyzing that data flow means they know the products and services in which customers 
in an given area are interested, in what volume and when. It uses this information to 
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advise specific stores concerning the products and services they should offer at a given 
time. 
This affects personnel training and support, as franchisees must become familiar 
with the expanding offerings. Thus, as with other leading IT users, it is important for IY 
to know when there is need for human contact and when technology can be substituted. 
Balancing these is critical to success. There is also the need to understand the form the 
substitution should take, as well as how to sell it to the customer though in-store or on-
line personnel. Using store personnel to initiate requests for new IT support systems 
certainly helps to keep this balance, but the practical test is if IY is attracting customers to 
new products and services that are profitable. 
Conclusion 
NRI's strategic problem in the 1990s was how to develop a strategy that was 
independent of its relationships with IY and the Nomura Group, but could still leverage 
off the experience and expertise developed through these relationships without 
compromising them in any way. To benefit from the effects of the Big Bang and the 
liberalization in retailing, NRI's strategic solution took three forms. The first was to 
aggressively grow its systems franchises by drafting system design proposals that will 
satisfy the tough requirements of the two major clients, Nomura and IY, while taking into 
account of the latest technology available. The second was to develop and expand its 
R&D to accumulate the know-how and the experience with systems of wider marketing 
potential that were IT intensive and could use the IT expertise developed for Nomura and 
IY, without using the proprietary systems developed for them. 
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These included areas such as asset and trust management support services and 
"integrated services from systems design and development to the integrated operation of 
computers and networks to supermarkets, convenience stores, family type restaurants, 
and other chain store or multi-outlet operations that sell an extensive array of items in 
small volumes" to quote NRI marketing material. Thus, NRI offers products and services 
that leverage its experience and work with their clients. The third part of the strategy has 
been to expand by merging the skills developed through the first two activities and its 
R&D together so as to enter totally new businesses efficiently such as e-commerce, m-
commerce, and ITS related activities.14 
The results from implementing this three-pronged strategy have been excellent in 
terms of increased revenue and a larger user base (Tables 1 and 3). This success in 
growing the business in a depressed economy and despite intense competition has been 
based on NRI's support for IY's successful IT-based strategy and its ability to leverage 
the preeminent positions of its major clients. This has enhanced NRI's visibility and 
differentiated it from other IT service providers. It also has helped NRI be more cost 
effective through use of some of the systems developed for its major clients. 
NRI's marketing naturally emphasizes its national presence and branch network 
backed-up by a variety of sophisticated IT R&D, support and delivery systems. The 
strategy depends on NRI's wide ranging R&D; existing IT infrastructure, including its IT 
network and computer centers; its systems software; and management's evaluation of 
potential customers' ability to use recently developed information technology. At the 
same time, NRI has to protect the proprietary systems and interests of its major clients. 
l4 For more detailed information on Toyota's Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) and related strategies 
see Rapp (2000a). 
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The strategy's success thus also has depended on NRI's R&D, marketing and delivery of 
products and services that leverage but do not compromise its major client relationships. 
NRI must assure that its product and service development evolves in a way that is 
responsive to anticipated changes in its major clients' requirements, as well as in the 
technology used to deliver and support their products and services. To address these and 
related strategic and management issues, NRI has developed dedicated groups that work 
closely with its two major customer groups and their evolving requirements. Based on 
this interaction, it then is constantly building changes into its software systems and 
constantly modifying them based on changes in available technology and on close 
discussions, feedback, and interaction with the Nomura and IY users. 
In many cases it tries to anticipate the interaction between its major customers and 
potential technology changes. In this way NRI is constantly offering these customers 
products and services that are well focused on their changing IT product and service 
needs. Further, the delivery mechanisms are continually adapted to technology changes 
such as Internet-related services. 
Establishing beneficial IT R&D appears to be part of NRI's and its major clients' 
thought processes. This builds the basis for NRI's business success too, including 
customer and service diversification, and thus contributes to earnings. Because customer 
trust is the key to customer retention in IT services, stronger companies that can 
anticipate customer needs find it easier to retain customer confidence and will benefit 
from the success of major clients. NRI's clients' success then sets the context for other 
business in related areas. This is another beneficial loop, as such business increases 
revenues and lowers costs by expanding the user base. NRI's continued success in these 
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various interactive processes should reinforce the perception that it is among Japan's top 
IT service organizations and the continued leader in IT support related to financial 
services and retailing. 
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NRI three primary businesses are Research and Consulting; Knowledge Solutions; 
and Systems Solutions - Major Service Units: 
Research and Consulting Sector carries out surveys and offers consulting in the fields 
of economics, management, industry, social systems, and information and 
communications systems to provide practical insights for decision-making. 
Knowledge Solution Sector that supports key business processes by providing 
systematic solutions for knowledge management, e-commerce, and asset management 
using knowledge of entire Group to provide continuous service and systematic 
solutions. 
Systems Solutions services private-sector and government customers to plan, design, 
build and operate world-class information and communications systems. It is divided 
into finance, industrial, data services, systems consulting, and solution products. 
Financial Systems Solution Sector integrate NRI's system solutions for the 
financial markets, including: 
Order Contract Management System (MX-TRADE) that provides strong support 
for order contract management operations for fund management companies and is 
a key system for realizing STP (straight through processing). 
Securities STP Network (Smart Bridge) Electronic Message for tracing messages 
from pre-trade stage to post-trade stage, significantly reducing managerial work. 
Trust Bank Disclosure Sharing Systems Network (SYNTAX) that is an electronic 
information release system for trust accounts managed by trust banks. 
Investment Trust Internet Marketing System (Fund Direct) is a support system for 
investment trust-Internet marketing. 
Investment Trust Marketing Support System (Fundmark/Express) integrates 
functional support for marketing asset management-type investment trusts. 
Industrial and Social Systems Solution Sector plans and designs information 
and communications systems by proposing and developing projects for the 
distribution and manufacturing industries as well as government organizations. 
Data Service Sector provides comprehensive system operation services for 
customers' enterprise and client/server network computing systems. 
Systems Consulting Division provides IT management consulting, specializing 
in IT solutions and system design for finance, distribution and manufacturing. 
Solution Products Division offers platform and system solutions to deliver 
competitive advantage through optimal utilization of latest IT advances. 
NRI's Security and Financial Systems Division provides customized systems to 
Japanese (STAR-III) and foreign firms (I-STAR) including those foreign securities firms 
that are bank affiliated. These systems are thus segmented to suit each group's different 
requirements. The former provides on-line account processing, database search and 
processing, external information retrieval, communications tools and office automation 
Table 6 - NRI Product-Market Matrix* 
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functions for domestic securities firms. The latter supports back-office work for foreign 
bank and securities companies for "transaction control, accounting, required ledger 
updating and preparation of various reports and documents for submission to financial 
inspection authorities." 
NRI has a separate division that offers comprehensive IT support services to life and non-
life insurance companies that covers systems planning, consulting and development that 
is then coupled with systems operation and support. These systems are especially focused 
on helping to give these firms the IT support they need to enter into the new businesses 
that are opening as a result of the Big Bang. This includes these firms' increasing 
emphasis on customer life cycles to position and market such products (Rapp 1999c). 
This support also includes a BPR product similar to the one used by Nomura in 
restructuring its computer support systems. 
Table 7 
Summary of Recent Performance Ito-Yokado and Seven-Eleven Japan 
(Unconsolidated) 
Table 8 
Summary of Performance of the 8 CVS as of 1998 
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